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ABSTRACT 
The empirical evidence predicts that political institutions are the core component of 
institutional matrix. They set stages for other institutions to be devised and influence the 
economic growth. Applying Kremer et al.’s (2013) dynamic panel threshold regression to a 
selected panel of 77 emerging market and developing countries over the period 1976–2010, we 
provide compelling evidence in favor of a split base on political institutions in the finance-
growth nexus. The asymmetric impact of institutions on growth sets in around the optimum 
threshold level. Minimizing political risks through improvement in the quality of political 
institutions can improve the growth dividend due to financial development. Our empirical 
results appear to be robust across a wide range of alternative empirical strategies, several new 
disaggregate measures of political institutions, and also when addressing the endogeneity 
issues of the regressors. 
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